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Abstract
This paper examines the conventional assumption that bilateral transport
costs are symmetric. We develop an economic geography model with transport
sector in which asymmetric freight rates can occur as a result of density economies.
Comparing this to models without density economies, we show that agglomeration
of economic activities is more likely to emerge and that multiple equilibria can
emerge for some parameters. Then we show the change in its bifurcation and
stability of equilibrium and conclude that economies of density in transport ows
can act as an agglomeration force.
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1 Introduction
Recent decades have witnessed the emergence of a growing literature that analyzes the
relationship between transport costs and the spatial structure of economic activities
(Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999)). The remarkable progress in this eld was
made possible in part by adopting the simple assumption that transport costs are
symmetric. The purpose of this paper is to relax this assumption of symmetric transport
costs. Hereafter, we call freight rates as the price for transport services and transport
costs as its costs. We call the typical assumption of symmetric transport costs as
symmetric freight rates to distinguish the di¤erence between them.1 Freight rates are
often asymmetric, even along the same route. Some simple results of the Survey of
Net National Freight Circulation of Japan (SNNFCJ) in truck transportation indicates
that the degree of asymmetry in freight rates (resp., transport ow) is 1.45 (resp. 1.85)
at the 50th percentile and 3.98 (resp. 11.6) at the 95the percentile.2 Such directional
imbalance in freight rates simultaneously result from and in the cause of agglomeration.
In the studies on truck transport, economies of density are one of the characteristics
of this sector. With microdata of SNNFCJ, Konishi, Mun, Nishiyama and Sung (2012)
focused on shipment delivery by chartered trucks, which a transport rm used a single
truck to transport only for a single customer. By analyzing such a data, they found
that signicant scale economies were present at the individual-shipment level. At the
rm level, Keeler (1989) found evidence of increasing returns from survival analysis
during the period that followed deregulation in the United States. Allen and Liu (1995)
conrmed scale economies in truck transport sector by controlling the service quality
such as transit time, delivery reliability, and shipper convenience. At the route level,
Tanaka and Tsubota (2014) used SNNFCJ data to show the occurrence of asymmetry
in freight rates as a result of the presence of density economies and found that unit
freight rates appeared to be lower for the direction of a route with the greater ow of
truck shipments. All of these studies indicate the presence of density economies in the
transport sector.3 In this paper, we elucidate the role that density economies plays in
1Throughout this paper, we assume that transport costs are identical for both direction. However,
our analysis shows that freight rates can be asymmetric.
2SNNFCJ is a commodity ow survey conducted once ve years. For details empirical study, see
Tanaka and Tsubota (2014).
3Apart from truck transport, Jonkeren, Demirel, van Ommeren and Rietveld (2011) investigated
the e¤ect of directional imbalance of shipment ows on one-way marine freight rates. In their study,
the imbalance of transport ows was identied as a backhaul problem for a maritime transport rm,
implying that for a given pair of points, a larger quantity of shipments in one direction led to higher
freight rates for this direction. Their analysis of inland marine shipments in Northern Europe showed
that imbalance of transport ows increased the unit shipping prices. Additionally, Clark, Dollar and
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accounting for a directional imbalance of freight rates within a competitive market for
transport services.4 The simplest assumption on freight rates is that freight rates are
symmetric and independent of transport ow. This assumption can be interpreted as
modeling the case in which the technology of the transport sector has constant returns
to scale and thus cost depends on only the distance. With a few exceptions, this
assumption is typically adopted in the construction of the models in New Economic
Geography and international trade. Instead of assuming symmetry or constant returns
to scale, we assume that transportation technology is characterized by density economies
and that freight rates are lower price for larger volume. In this case, density economies
tends to reduce freight rates in the direction associated with greater transport ows.
In addition, the higher demand for transport services encourages the entry of transport
rms into the region of greater outow to meet the transport demand. As a result, this
competitive e¤ect will further lower freight rates in the direction with greater transport
ows. Meanwhile, because chartered trucks are being used, transport rms in region
A will have an incentive to charge lower prices than those in region B, which has
smaller transport ows. Such behavior of transport rms a¤ects the location choice
of (for example manufacturing) rms which can choose either of the two regions. The
relocation of some manufacturing rms from B to A would a¤ect interregional demand
in the following two ways. First, this relocation directly reverses the direction of the
shipment of the goods. Second, migration of skilled workers is associated with the
relocation of rms, which results in a change in the relative market size since these
workers are consumers of the goods produced in the other region. The rst e¤ect
increases interregional demand from A to B, the second e¤ect decreases it. These
two forces a¤ect interregional demand and make the manufactured goods market and
transport market dependent on one another. Because of this interlinkage among two
sectors in two regions, technological improvement in the transport sector is expected
to a¤ect all of the markets. Our analysis shows that endogenous determination of
freight rates yields important implications for the spatial location of economic activities.
Micco (2004) and Blonigen and Wilson (2008) provided similar evidence of the impact of a trade
imbalance on freight rates in international trade involving marine shipping.
4Note that in the transport literature, as scale economies capture increasing returns with pro-
portional increase of serving points, density economies capture increasing returns with given serving
points. For example, see the denition in Caves, Christensen and Tretheway (1984). In the two-region
model without space in each region, we cannot model scale economies in transport sector including
serving points. In this paper, we employ density economies as a notion to capture the decline in price
as demand increases for a route in one direction. However, we partly capture scale economies in regard
to the presence of xed inputs except serving points. Possible extensions including scale economies in
transport sector are discussed in the last section.
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Intuitively, the concentration of production in a core region implies large transport
ows from the core to the peripheral region. When transport ows from the core to
the periphery increase, freight rates decline further in this direction because of the
operation of economies of density in transport ows, leading to a relative increase in
the transport cost for the opposite direction. Consequently, endogenous determination
of freight rates magnies the directional imbalance of transport ows. A directional
imbalance of freight rates can thus act as an additional agglomeration force. To examine
the impact of density economies on the location of economic activities, we constructed
an economic geography model and examine how it shapes the distribution of rms.
Specically, we embedded endogenous determination of freight rates in the model of
Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002). The resulting model showed that there were
mutual interactions between density economies and the spatial distribution of economic
activities. A comparison of our model with a model in which density economies were
absent in transport sector showed that agglomeration of economic activities is more
likely to emerge under any range of cost parameters. Thus, our results suggest that
endogenous freight rates magnify agglomeration forces but not dispersing forces.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop an economic
geography model to analyze spatial agglomeration and introduce the transport sector.
In Section 3, we demonstrate location equilibria and analyze the impacts of technical
improvements in the transport sector. Section 4 o¤ers policy implications stemming
from a comparison with previous results described in the literature, and some concluding
comments.
2 Theoretical Analysis
Before going into the details of our analysis, we rst contrast our model with those de-
scribed in previous studies. Our theoretical analysis is closely related to that in some of
these studies, but it di¤ers in the specics of the transport sector. Mori and Nishikimi
(2002) introduced density economies into a three-region model and showed the emer-
gence of a hub as an agglomeration of economic activities. However, there were no
directional imbalance in the transport ow and costs in that model. Behrens, Gaigne
and Thisse (2009) examined the presence of density economies in an economic geogra-
phy model in which total transport ows in both directions determined freight rates.
However, because of this specication, endogenous directional imbalance of freight rates
cannot arise. In contrast, on the basis of observation of the backhaul problem in mar-
4
itime transport, Behrens and Picard (2011) and Takahashi (2011) considered directional
imbalance of both the transport ow and freight rates. They assumed that freight rates
depend on the directional imbalance of transport ow and that, for a given route, freight
rates are higher in the direction for which volumes were larger. They nd that shrinkage
of coreperiphery patterns occur due to the weakened agglomeration force. In contrast
to the assumptions of Behrens and Picard (2011) and Takahashi (2011), we incorporate
the role of density economies and directional imbalance of transport ow and freight
rates.
Our model is built upon the one in Ottaviano et al. (2002). Their model can be
regarded as a model, for comparison, without density economies nor directional imbal-
ance. We introduce density economies in the form employed by Behrens et al. (2009)
where density economies exist at route level. To provide a simple model with trans-
port sector, we focus exclusively on chartered transport.5 Relaxing the assumption of
symmetric freight rates within a simple two-region model and allowing for the presence
of density economies in transport routes, we o¤er an explanation for the directional
imbalance of freight rates and examine stable location equilibria.
2.1 The model
The economy in this study is composed of two regions, labeled r and s. There are two
production factors: H, the units of skilled workers, and L, the units of unskilled workers.
Whereas unskilled workers are viewed as immobile and are equally dispersed between
the two regions, skilled workers can move freely between the two regions and their
distribution is expressed as r+s = 1 = H. We include three sectors in the model: the
traditional sector produces a homogeneous good (q0) under a technology with constant
returns to scale; the manufacturing sector produces a continuum of di¤erentiated goods,
indexed by v 2 [0; 1]; and the transport sector produces cross-regional shipment services.
We assume preferences are identical among all workers and are described by
Ur = q0 + 
Z 1
0
qr (v) dv      
2
Z 1
0
(qr (v))
2 dv   
2
Z 1
0
qr (v) dv
2
; (1)
5Tanaka and Tsubota (2014) showed an empirical specication to identify net e¤ects between back-
haul problem and density economies and found the dominance of density economies in Japanese truck
transport. Our assumption is consistent with their ndings.
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where  > 0 and  >  > 0 are parameters, and qr (v) is the consumption of good i
in region r. 6 Consumers maximize a utility function subject to a budget constraint,
given as
R 1
0
pr (v) qr (v) dv + q0 = wr + q0; where wr is the wage rate in region r. The
demand for a good v is expressed as
qsr (v) = a  (b+ c) psr (v) + cPr; (2)
where a =  1; b =  1; c =  (   ) 1  1 and Pr indicates the price index of region
r: For the sake of simplicity, we assume manufacturing rms are symmetric and drop the
index of good. The price index can then be written as Pr =
R 1
0
pr (v) di = nrprr+nspsr,
where all the subscripts expressed by the two characters, r and s, indicate origin and
destination regions, and nr and ns are the number of manufacturing rms in regions r
and s, respectively.
The production of one unit of a homogeneous good is assumed to require one unit of
unskilled labor, and the shipment of this homogeneous good is assumed to be costless.
Thus, the wages of unskilled workers are equal between regions and set as the numéraire
(p0r = p
0
s = wr = ws = 1). In contrast to homogeneous goods, cross-regional shipments
of manufacturing goods incur freight rates. The freight rates from region r to region s
are expressed by trs, which is set by the transport sector. Production of di¤erentiated
manufactured goods requires unskilled workers as a variable input and skilled workers
as a xed input. As in Ottaviano et al. (2002) and without loss of generality, we set
the marginal requirement of unskilled workers equal to zero. The prot function of a
manufacturing rm in region r is then expressed as
r = prrqrr + (prs   trs) qrs  Wr; (3)
where Wr represents the nominal wage for skilled workers. We assume that each re-
gion is segmented and that rms set their price in a spatially discriminated manner.
Accordingly, rms in region r maximize their prot with respect to the sum of prr and
prs. As shown in Ottaviano et al. (2002),we obtain the equilibrium prices as follows:
prr =
2a+ cnstsr
2 (2b+ c)
; prs = prr +
trs
2
; for r 6= s; (4)
qrr = (b+ c) prr; qrs = (b+ c) (prs   trs) ; for r 6= s: (5)
6For a given value of ;  expresses the substitutability between goods, and so long as  > ; the
utility function exhibits love of variety.
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It is evident from the cross-regional demand for manufactured goods that when freight
rates are high, the demand becomes zero. When freight rates are too high to have
positive demand, the condition can be written as,
trs <
2a
2b+ c  cnr ; for r 6= s; (6)
which is obtained from the cross-regional demand in (5). This trade feasibility condition
is directional. As we discuss in the following sections, and in contrast to the previous
literature and original model of Ottaviano et al. (2002), for some of our cases, only
unidirectional trade occurs. In such cases, freight rates for one direction exceed the
trade feasibility condition and the demand is consequently zero. When freight rates
for both directions are above the trade feasibility condition, there is no trade at all
between regions, autonomy. To ensure positive trade at least in the case of symmetric
distribution, we obtain trade feasibility conditions as
trs

nr==1=2
<
4a
4b+ c
: (7)
At equilibrium, all operating prots of manufacturing rms are assumed to be zero.
Applying the zero-prot condition to manufacturing rms, we obtain the wages of
skilled workers as follows:
Wr = (b+ c)
 
L
2
+ r

p 2rr +

L
2
+ s

pss   trs
2
2!
: (8)
With the equilibrium prices, the consumer surplus, Sr, in the equilibrium can be written
as
Sr =
a2
2b
  a (nrprr + nspsr)  c
2
(nrprr + nspsr)
2 +
b+ c
2
 
nrp
2
rr + nsp
2
sr

: (9)
For the above equations, symmetric expressions hold for region s.
2.2 Transport sector
In this section, we model a transport sector based on the empirical observations
on the density economies. We assume that the technology of the transport sector
exhibits economies of density and is characterized by the presence of xed costs. The
production of transport services needs unskilled workers as both variable and xed
inputs. In order to keep the model simple, we also assume that transport market is
spatially segmented and rms operate only for one direction and determine the freight
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rates for one direction of a specic route depending on its transport ow a là Cournout.
Since there is no restriction on worker mobility between the traditional and transport
sectors, the wages of unskilled workers are identical between sectors and equal to one.
Then the prot function of a transport rm i is written as
Trs
 
drsi ;d
rs
 i

= (trs (Drs)  ) drsi   f; (10)
where drsi is the quantity of transport services from region r to s, d
rs
 i is the quantity of
transport service from r to s supplied by the other rms, trs (Drs) is an inverse demand
for transport services,  is the marginal requirement of unskilled workers, and f is the
xed requirement.7
From (5), the aggregate demand for transport services can be expressed by the
transport ow of cross-regional manufactured goods as
Drs = nr

L
2
+ s

qrs = nr (b+ c) (prs   trs)

L
2
+ s

; for r 6= s: (11)
Using the above equation, we obtain an inverse demand for transport services as follows,
trs (Drs) =
2a
2b+ c  cnr  
2 (2b+ c)
(2b+ c  cnr)nr (L=2 + s)Drs: (12)
For the market-clearing condition, we haveDrs =
Pmrs
i=1 d
rs
i , wheremrs is the number
of transport rms serving a transport route from r to s. Since the inverse demand in
(12) is a linear function, there is a Nash equilibrium in the space of pure strategies.
The equilibrium freight rate is given by a unique and symmetric solution as
trs (nr;mrs (nr; s)) =
2a
(2b+ c  cnr) (1 +mrs)  

1 +mrs
+  : (13)
Applying the free entry condition in the transport sector on (10) with (13) ; we obtain
the equilibrium number of transport companies as follows:
mrs (ns; s) =

2a
2b+ c  cnr   

2 (2b+ c) f
(2b+ c  cnr)nr (L=2 + s)
  1
2
  1: (14)
As is clear from the above equation, the comparative statics show dmrs
df
< 0 and dmrs
d
< 0.
An increase in xed and marginal costs leads to a reduction in the number of transport
companies. Note that the population of region r i expressed in the denominator of the
7This xed requirement is assumed to be non-negative.
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second term as (L=2 + r). The e¤ect of population size in the destination region is
dmrs
d(L=2+r)
> 0. Similarly, we also have the e¤ect of manufacturing rms in the origin
region as dmrs
dnr
> 0.
Substituting the equation (14) into (13) ; we can rewrite the unit freight rate function
as
trs (nr; s) =

2 (2b+ c) f
(2b+ c (1  nr))nr (L=2 + s)
 1
2
+  : (15)
Increases in marginal and xed costs naturally increase freight rate as we have dtrs
d
>
0 and dtrs
df
> 0. This shows unambiguous correspondence between freight rates and
transport costs. Additional observations of the unit freight rate function shows the
following properties: dtrs
dnr
< 0; and dtrs
d(L=2+s)
< 0. This means that transport volume
and price are a function of the number of shippers (i.e., manufacturing companies),
and the size of the consumer population. To observe positive demand for transport
services, there must be a company producing a commodity in one region and shipping
it to customers in another region. The derivative shows that unit freight rate decreases
when there is an increase in either manufacturing rms in the origin region or skilled
workers in the destination region. The reason for this is that these two e¤ects increase
cross-regional demand, and this greater demand decreases unit freight rate through
density economies. Since one unit of skilled workers is employed by a manufacturing
rm, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the share of rms, n, and that of
skilled workers, . Substituting nr = r =  and s = 1   , we can rewrite the unit
freight rate function as,
trs () =

2 (2b+ c) f
(2b+ c (1  )) (L=2 + (1  ))
 1
2
+  : (16)
The above equation indicates that distribution of skilled workers and the relative pop-
ulation size of unskilled workers determine the shape of the function. This is because
the distribution of skilled workers corresponds to the location of supply of the di¤er-
entiated goods, while the distribution of both workers determines the demand for the
goods. Note that when xed costs of the transport sector, f , are zero, freight rates
depend on constant marginal costs only. Examining the properties of this function, as
detailed in Appendix II, we present the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Unit freight rate function has the following characteristics associated
with the relative population size of unskilled workers and the degree of spatial concen-
tration of skilled workers.
9
(i) When f = 0, it is constant.
(ii) When f > 0 and L < 4b= (2b  c), it has its minimum in  2 [0; 1].
(iii) When f > 0 and L = 4b= (2b  c), it is monotonically decreasing in .
This proposition states that xed requirements in the transport sector are essential
to exhibit density economies and that the population size of unskilled workers deter-
mines the shape of the function. Since the distribution of both skilled and unskilled
workers a¤ects the demand for inter-regional transport, the relative sizes of the popu-
lations also matters for the determination of freight rates. In Figure 1, we plot freight
rates from the origin r to the destination s for four cases of the population of unskilled
workers L.8 Note that trs is the maximum freight rates to have the cross-regional
demand non-negative. From the top, L is 1, 3, 5, and 10; respectively.
=Figure 1 comes around here.=
There are two forces at work, namely, the relocation of producers and consumers.
Suppose that some rms relocate from region B to region A. The change of produc-
tion location must reverse the direction of intra-regional transport ow. This change
increases intra-regional transport ow from A to B, while decreasing the ow from B
to A. On the other hand, since skilled workers employed at the relocating rms were
also consumers in region B, their relocation shift intra-regional demand from A to B.
Thus, in the event of some rms relocating from B to A, the sum of these two e¤ects
may decrease or increase intra-regional demand from A to B. If the population size
of unskilled workers is relatively smaller, the relocation e¤ect of producers is smaller
since there are fewer unskilled consumers in the other region, while the relocation e¤ect
of consumers becomes larger since the relative consumption expenditure of skilled is
larger. Consequently, the relocation e¤ect of producers may be smaller than that of
consumers. This means that the intra-regional demand for some varieties that change
production location is smaller than the amount consumed by the skilled workers who
changed their residence. In other words, the relative population size of skilled and
unskilled workers matters because it a¤ects the determination of the dominant force
in either of the abovementioned cases. When the population size of unskilled work-
ers is relatively smaller (specically, when L < 4b= (2b  c)), the freight rates function
becomes U-shaped. In such cases, the relocation of skilled workers does not always
8The parameters are as follows: b = 1; c = 1; f = 0:1;and  = 0: As is obvious from (16), increasing
the marginal costs,  , simply pushes the function upward. Under the above parameters, the critical
value in determining the shape of transport costs function is 4.
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decrease freight rates. Such examples, when L = 1 or 3, are shown in Figure 1. When
the population of unskilled workers holds the condition, L = 4b= (2b  c), the freight
rates function is monotonically decreasing.
Unit freight rate function reects the spatial distribution of economic activities
when transport technology is characterized by density economies. This is consistent
with the ndings of Keeler (1989) and others discussed in the previous section. In the
following sections, we further examine interdependencies with manufacturing sector and
associated location equilibria.
3 Location equilibria
The preceding section keeps the distribution of skilled workers as exogenous. In
this section, we extend our analysis to the long run equilibrium of industrial locations
determined by mobile skilled workers. The analysis follows Ottaviano et al. (2002).
Without a loss of generality, we drop the subscript of the share of skilled workers by
specifying r =  and s = 1  . Moreover, for the sake of convenience, we set region
r as the core region when it emerges. The law of motion of skilled workers is dened
by the welfare comparison of workers and is expressed by
Vr (;mrs;msr)  Vr (;mrs;msr)  Vs (;mrs;msr) ; (17)
where Vr = Sr+Wr+q0. We dene a spatial equilibrium as a distribution of skilled work-
ers that satises one of the following three conditions: i)  2 (0; 1) when Vr () = 0,
ii)  = 1 when Vr (1) > 0, or iii) 
 = 0 when Vr (0) < 0. An interior equilibrium is
stable if and only if any marginal migration of skilled workers recover original distribu-
tion by inverse migration. For example, marginal migration decreases the utility at the
destination region and induces reverse migration to the original region. This stability
condition can be expressed as dV () =d < 0 at  = .
3.1 Symmetric equilibrium
Inclusion of the directional imbalance of freight rates within the model makes the
expression of indirect utility di¤erential more complicated than that of the models
with symmetric freight rates (cf. Ottaviano et al. (2002)). However, as shown in
Appendix III, we have simpler expressions for the e¤ects of directional freight rates
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around symmetric distribution:
dV j=1=2 = dW j=1=2 + dSj=1=2 (18)
= 1t
 (2   t) (19)
where t  tsrj=1=2 = trsj=1=2 =  + 4
s
(2b+ c) f
(L+ 1) (4b+ c)
; (20)
1 
(b+ c) ((6bc+ 6b2 + c2) + c (2b+ c)L)
2 (2b+ c)2
;
2 
4a (3b+ 2c)
((6bc+ 6b2 + c2) + c (2b+ c)L)
:
We found that there is a critical value of stable symmetric equilibrium that satises
dV () =d = 0. We call this critical value a break point. The break point can
be expressed as 2 = t
: Note that t is the freight rates evaluated at the symmetric
distribution of skilled workers, which is equivalent to the break point in Ottaviano et al.
(2002). When 2 < t
; the symmetric distribution is stable; otherwise it is unstable.
Proposition 2 If 2 <  +4
p
(2b+ c) f= (L+ 1) (4b+ c), then the symmetric distrib-
ution is stable for all values of  and f . Otherwise, it is unstable.
From the proposition, we can nd that endogenous determination of freight rates
leads to the decomposition of break point and it shows that break point is a function of
preference parameters, transport cost parameters and population of unskilled workers.
When transport costs are higher or unskilled population is smaller, symmetric distribu-
tion is more stable. Figure 2 shows numerical simulation results for the indirect utility
di¤erential, V (), with di¤erent cost parameters for the given preference parameters.9
Specically, Figure 2 shows how marginal changes in the distribution of skilled workers
a¤ect the indirect utility di¤erential. The gure indicates the decrease in xed (resp.,
marginal) costs. Location equilibria are obtained at the crossing points of the function
and the x-axis. The equilibrium is stable when the slope is negative. When more than
one crossing occur, this indicates multiple equilibria. Such instances of partial agglom-
eration are observed for decreasing xed costs when f = 0:9 or 0:85, and for decreasing
marginal costs when  = 0:15. In these cases, two equilibria with partial agglomeration
are stable and the symmetric distribution is unstable. As is evident from Figure 2,
symmetric distribution is always an equilibrium point, but its stability depends on the
9We set the parameters as a = 1:5, b = c = 1 and L = 6. For the result in Figure 2a, we set
 = 0:05, and for Figure 2b f = 0:7.
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parameter values. From both the gure and the analytical solution presented in (20),
it can be seen that with decreasing marginal and/or xed costs, there is a change in
location equilibria from a symmetric distribution to a core-periphery structure.
=Figure 2 comes around here.=
We can further characterize the break point analytically. Taking equality between
freight rates function at symmetric distribution,trsj=1=2 in (20), and symmetry break
point, 2 as trsj=1=2 = 2, and arranging this equality for xed costs, we obtain the
symmetry break point as,
f =
(1 + L) (4b+ c)
16 (2b+ c)
(2   )2 for  2 [0; 2] : (21)
When  > 2, we always have symmetric equilibrium. Note that when f = 0, our model
is identical to that of Ottaviano et al. (2002) and that keeping all parameter values
constant, if xed costs are higher, it induces not only strong economies of density but
also higher freight rates. Two other conditions guarantee positive trade between regions
under symmetric equilibrium. Both conditions are simply written as t < t12

=1=2
and
2 < t12

=1=2
. For t < t12

=1=2
. Then, from (7) and (20), we have the inequality as
t < trs. After rearranging the equation, we have
f <
(1 + L) ((4b+ c)    4a)2
16 (2b+ c) (4b+ c)
for  2

0;
4a
4b+ c

: (22)
Whenever the condition in (22) holds, two symmetric regions have positive trade. When
f  (1+L)((4b+c) 4a)2
16(2b+c)(4b+c)
for  2 0; 4a
4b+c

, or  > 4a
4b+c
; the two regions are symmetric
autarkies.10 For 2 < t12

=1=2
, after arranging the equations, we obtain
3b+ c
c
< L: (23)
These are the conditions for attaining a stable symmetric equilibrium with positive
trade. Under such conditions, the freight rates function is also limited in some ranges.
Comparing the threshold in Proposition 1 with ( 23), we have the following equation:
3b+ c
c
  4b
2b  c =
(b  c) (6b+ c)
c (2b  c) : (24)
10Note that the type of utility function is quasi-log linear and it allows the demand to be zero for
some of di¤erentiated goods that appear under conditions of symmetric autarky. See, for example,
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Comite, Thisse and Vandenbussche (2014).
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As long as we assume that the utility function as b  c, we have L > 3b+c
c
 4b
2b c
and, consequently, the freight rates function is strictly decreasing. Otherwise, when the
population size is 3b+c
c
< L < 4b
2b c , the freight rates function is U-shape.
3.2 Core-periphery structure
When all rms are concentrated in a region, the resulting location equilibrium is
known as the core-periphery structure. The sustainability of the core-periphery struc-
ture can be characterized by the presence of an incentive for any rm to change their
location from the core region to the peripheral region. To observe the presence of
such incentives, we examine the di¤erences between the indirect utilities of the core
and periphery, expressing these as V (1) = W (1) + S (1). Obviously, as long as
V (1) > 0;, there is no incentive for rms to relocate from the core to the periphery.
Because of the presence of density economies in the transport sector, as skilled workers
agglomerate in the core, the freight rates from the core to the periphery decrease and
those from the periphery to the core increase. When most of the skilled workers ag-
glomerate in the core region, only the small fraction of manufacturing rms remain in
the periphery so that there is little demand for transport services to the core region. Be-
cause the transport demand from the periphery is too small for shipments, freight rates
increase and may exceed the feasibility condition of trade in (6) as tsr = limr=1 tsr =
2a= (2b+ c). To highlight the incentives that exist in the core-periphery structure, we
obtain the indirect utility di¤erential with freight rates from the periphery at their
maximum as, tsr = 2a= (2b+ c). After some straightforward calculations, we have
Sj=1 =
(b+ c)2 (2a  btrs) trs
2 (2b+ c)2
> 0; (25)
W j=1 =
(b+ c)
8 (2b+ c)

8atsr + L (tsr   trs) (4a  (tsr + trs) (2b  c))  2t 2sr (2b+ c+ Lc)

;
(26)
where the inequality shown in (25) comes from trsj=1 < trs  2a= (2b+ c).Because
@tsr=@s < 0 and  = 1, we always have tsr > trs. Observing the above equations with
preference parameters constant reveals two main factors that support the sustainability
of the core-periphery structure. One is freight rates from the core to the periphery
and the other is the population of unskilled workers. It is evident from the equations
that V j=1 may be negative, only when the bracketed part takes negative values
in (26). Such cases emerge under two circumstances. First, the second term in the
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bracketed part may become negative when 4a < (tsr + trs) (2b  c). Since we know that
for a core-periphery structure, tsr = tsr = 2a= (2b+ c) ; by substituting this equation
into the inequality, we can obtain the condition trs > 2a (2b+ 3c) = (2b  c) (2b+ c).
Similarly, the third term in the bracket becomes larger when trs is higher. Thus, for
higher freight rates from the core to the periphery, trs; the inequality holds and the
core-periphery structure becomes unstable. Second, the third term takes large values
when the population of unskilled workers is larger. When the population of immobile
unskilled is larger, the dispersion force becomes stronger, which is consistent with the
ndings in Ottaviano et al. (2002). However, since we cannot obtain an analytical
solution for the critical value of the stable core-periphery structure, the so-called sustain
point, we simulate the values for certain parameters. In our setting, the equilibrium
price of manufacturing rms contains competition e¤ect where in the same market if
there are more competitors price becomes lower and so there are the incentives for the
rms at the core to move to periphery where there is less competitive environment even
with the high freight rates.
=Figure 3 comes around here.=
Figure 3 shows the e¤ect of decreasing marginal costs and the population size of
unskilled workers.11 The core-periphery structure is sustainable even at relatively high
xed costs when marginal costs are low. Since transport costs are composed of mar-
ginal and xed costs, the decrease in transport costs is captured by at least one of
the two costs. When the transport sector is highly regulated, transport rms are re-
quired to have higher xed costs, as characterized by high density economies. In this
case, a directional imbalance of freight rates becomes larger. Specically, freight rates
from the periphery to the core become higher, while those in the opposite direction
become lower. Consequently, freight rates from the periphery to the core reach the
trade feasibility condition shown in (6). This will cease cross-regional shipments from
the periphery to the core. In this case, while rms located in the periphery cannot
serve a market located in the core, rms in the core can serve the other market and en-
joy lower freight rates. This indicates stronger agglomeration forces due to economies
of density. Figure 3b shows that a decrease in the immobile population of unskilled
workers results in less stability of the core-periphery structure. A decrease in the popu-
lation of unskilled workers leads to a relative expansion in the size of the population of
11For both gures, the parameters are set as a = 1:5, and b = c = 1. We also set L = 6 for Figure
3a and  = 0:1 for Figure 3b.
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skilled workers. Since the population of unskilled workers is assumed to be symmetric
between regions, and they are consumers of di¤erentiated goods, the dispersed demand
of the population of unskilled workers anchors rms in their regions. As the immobile
population increases, the proportion of the peripheral population within the economy
becomes smaller, reducing the benets of being located in the periphery.
Proposition 3 As transport costs are lowered and/or the relative size of the population
of unskilled workers is reduced, the core-periphery structure is more likely to emerge as
a stable location equilibrium.
Note that when xed costs are very high, the core-periphery structure is always
unstable. While high xed costs may be interpreted as large economies of density, it
also implies high average transport costs. Because of high transport costs, a symmetric
distribution is more stable.
3.3 Stable location equilibria
In the previous section, we examine the stability of symmetric and core-periphery
distributions of economic activities. In this section, by combining these results, we pro-
vide a comprehensive analysis of stable location equilibria. Proposition 2 states that
lower transport costs make symmetric distribution more unstable. Since symmetric
distribution becomes more unstable, this can be interpreted as an increase in agglomer-
ation forces. Proposition 3 states that lower transport costs induce more stability in the
core-periphery structure. These propositions are mutually consistent and suggest that
lower freight rates induce agglomeration of economic activities. For given preference
parameters, we simulated the stable location equilibria for various ranges of xed and
marginal costs, f and  , which describe a change in transport costs. As in ( 16), there
is a clear correspondence between freight rates and transport costs. Any decreases in
transport costs by policy changes such as deregulations or technological advancement
can result in decrease in freight rates. Figure 4 summarizes all of the stable location
equilibria from the numerical simulations of (17) for all combinations of f ,  , and .
High freight rates and high transport costs can be expressed by high xed and marginal
costs, as depicted in the upper right area of Figure 4.12 Corresponding low transport
costs are shown in the lower left area of the gure. Decreasing transport costs always
correspond to decreasing freight rates and are described by the move from the upper
right-side to the lower left-side.
12The parameters are set as a = 1:5; b = 1; c = 1 and L = 5.
16
The four main areas shown in Figure 4 depict symmetric autarky, symmetric equi-
librium, core-periphery structure, and multiple equilibria. As shown in the upper right
area of Figure 4, the stable equilibria change from symmetric autarky, symmetric equi-
librium, multiple equilibria, to a core-periphery structure as transport costs decrease.
These results are consistent with those of previous studies in New Economic Geogra-
phy. These studies have found that an agglomeration of economic activities occurs as
transport costs decrease, and the core-periphery structure becomes stable as a location
equilibrium. Symmetric autarky emerges above the transport costs of trade feasibility
and results in no trade between regions. The symmetric equilibrium is the location
equilibrium with positive trade and is the only stable equilibrium. Multiple equilibria
are areas with more than one stable equilibrium. There are three possible combina-
tions: core-periphery + symmetric equilibrium, core-periphery + partial agglomeration
equilibrium + symmetric equilibrium, and symmetric equilibrium + partial agglomer-
ation equilibrium. For the area designated as core-periphery, agglomeration of skilled
workers emerges and it is the unique equilibrium.
=Figure 4 comes around here.=
There are four thresholds, in the gure. Two of them are analytically obtained.
First, the critical value separating symmetric equilibrium from symmetric autarky can
be expressed as (22), which comes from the trade feasibility condition. Second, the
lowest transport costs for the stable symmetric equilibrium are at the break point
of symmetric equilibrium, which separates the area of the core-periphery structure
from that of multiple equilibria. This is written as (21).13 The other two thresholds
are obtained numerically. One is the threshold between multiple equilibria and the
symmetric equilibrium and was obtained from the sustainability point of the core-
periphery structure. Using (25) + (25), the threshold is the values that holdV (1) = 0.
The other threshold is for the area of partial agglomeration equilibrium. As discussed
with Figure 2, there are stable partial agglomeration equilibria. Unfortunately, we
could not obtain implicit expressions of the conditions for this area. Alternatively, we
can obtain this area by checking the shape of the function in (17). For each pair of
f and  , we obtained the continuous function (17) and counted the number of sign
changes by  2 [0; 1]. The occurrence of 3 or 5 sign changes indicates the region
of partial agglomeration equilibrium. We constructed a model based on Ottaviano
13Substituting f = 0 in (16) and 2 in (19) and setting all the parameters as described in footnote
10, we obtained the symmetry break point as  = 0:9677.
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et al. (2002), whose results showed neither partial agglomeration nor multiple equilibria.
By contrast, our results exhibited both multiple equilibria and partial agglomeration.
Given that our break point in (21) is qualitatively equivalent to the one in Ottaviano
et al. (2002), the overlapping area of the core-periphery structure in the symmetric
equilibrium indicates higher sustainability of the core-periphery structure and suggests
the agglomeration force becomes stronger in the model. The above results show that
the introduction of density economies in the transport sector drastically changes the
location equilibria, and we observe the emergence of multiple equilibria and partial
agglomeration. Summarizing these results, we present the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The presence of density economies in the transport sector acts as an
agglomeration force and results in multiple equilibria.
Note that when xed costs are too high, the core-periphery structure is always
unstable and symmetric distribution is the only stable equilibrium.
4 Conclusion
This paper relaxes the simple assumption on symmetric transport costs in New Eco-
nomic Geography. From the empirical observations of a large variation in transport
costs for a given pair of regions as in Tanaka and Tsubota (2014) and the presence of
density economies shown by Konishi et al. (2012), we constructed an economic geog-
raphy model with density economies. Applying this model, we found that when the
transport demand in one direction of a given route is greater than that in the opposite
direction, this reduces relative freight rates for the former in relation to the latter. Con-
sequently, the presence of density economies reduced transport costs from the larger
region. Moreover, it strengthened agglomeration forces to the core region by increasing
its accessibility. This result implies the existence of an additional market-driven force
that acts to strengthen the hierarchical structure among regions.
Critical di¤erence with and without endogenous freight rates enables us to consider a
deregulation of transport sector which levies uniform pricing which may be a function of
distance only. If regions are di¤erent in their sizes, any policy reform which allows non-
uniform pricing leads to a greater concentration of regional structure. Our results imply
that theoretical discussions that assume symmetric transport costs have overlooked the
additional agglomeration force emanating from the transport sector.
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To further discuss our ndings, it is possible to interpret high xed costs as strict
entry regulations or as less competitive environments. In such a case, symmetric distri-
bution is more likely to be stable. In other words, a more competitive transport sector
induces the symmetric distribution to become more stable and the core-periphery struc-
ture to become more stable. This suggests that policy reform of regulations governing
the transport sector would bring the agglomeration of economic activities.
There are some limitations in our paper. One crucial assumption is that all of
the transportations are assumed to be chartered. This assumption implies that all
of the return transport is empty. Returning empty or with less-than-full volume is a
non-negligible problem in transportation, which is called backhaul problem. Formal
introduction of this mechanism would require a combination of searching and matching
among suppliers and transporters and customers.14 To relax this assumption, further
consideration is needed on the composition of freight loads and the possible emergence of
consolidation services. Furthermore, transport networks are more complicated in terms
of its hubs and spoke systems than our simple two-region model. For such network
analysis, extension to multi-regional structure is necessary. These limitations suggest
directions for future research.
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Appendix I: Transport costs
The inverse transport service function can be rewritten as: (12) as,
trs (Drs) = grs   grshrsDrs;
where Drs  mrsdrsi
grs  2a
2b+ c  cnr ;
hrs  (2b+ c)
anr (L=2 + s)
:
Then, the unit freight rate function and volume of transport services are also rewrit-
ten as,
trs (r;mrs) =
grs
1 +mrs
  
1 +mrs
+  ;
drsi =
grs   
(1 +mrs) grshrs
:
Applying the free entry condition of this sector, (trs   )Drs=mrs   f = 0, we can
obtain the number of transport companies as,
mrs =
grs   p
fgrshrs
  1:
Since hrs reects the market size of the destination and the number of rms in the
origin, it is clear that the number of transport companies varies with changes in the
demand. Substituting the above results, we can rewrite the unit freight rate function
as
trs =
p
fgrshrs +  :
Similarly, the quantity can be derived as
drsi =
s
f
grshrs
=
s
f (2b+ c  cnr)nr (L=2 + s)
2 (2b+ c)
:
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Appendix II: Properties of the unit freight rate func-
tion
Taking r =  and s = 1   and the derivative of (16), we have

  d
d
trs =
f (2b+ c)
  6c2 + (2  1) (4b+ 4c+ Lc) + 2 (c  Lb)
2 (2b+ c  c)2 (L  2+ 2)2
q
f(2b+c)
(2b+c c)(L+2(1 ))
:
Since the denominator is always positive, the sign depends only on the numerator.
Note that if f = 0, then trs =  . Otherwise, the sign of 
 depends on a part of
the numerator, which, for notational convenience, we express as ()   6c2 +
(2  1) (4b+ 4c+ Lc) + 2 (c  Lb). This is a quadratic function of . The rst-order
derivative is obtained as d
d
() = 2 (4b+ 4c  6c+ Lc). At  = 0; we have (0) =
  (L+ 2) (2b+ c) < 0 and d
d
(0) = 2 (4b+ 4c+ Lc) > 0. Thus, 
 is a decreasing
function in the neighborhood at  = 0. At  = 1; we have (1) = L (2b  c)  4b and
d
d
(1) =  2 (4b  2c+ Lc). Additionally, at  = 1; we have (1) = 4b   L (2b  c)
and d
d
(1) = 2 (4b  2c+ Lc). Solving the last expression, when L > 2c 4b
c
, we have
d
d
 < 0, and () is a monotonically decreasing function for  2 [0; 1]. Otherwise,
() has a minimum in  2 [0; 1].
Appendix III: Stability of symmetric distribution
The di¤erentials of wage and consumer surplus are written as
W = Wr  Ws = (b+ c)

L
2
+ 

tsr

2a+ c (1  ) tsr
2 (2b+ c)

  tsr
4

 

L
2
+ 1  

trs

2a+ ctrs
2 (2b+ c)

  trs
4

;
S = Sr   Ss = (b+ c)
8 (2b+ c)2
 
4 (b+ c)
  
2a (trs + tsr)  b
 
t 2rs + t
2
sr

  tsr (2a  btsr)

+c2 (tsr   trs) (trs + tsr) (1  )

:
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As long as freight rates are identical under symmetric distribution and we express freight
rates as trs = tsr = t, the above di¤erential can be written as
W +S =
t (b+ c) ((2b+ c)Lc+ (6b2 + 6bc+ c2))
8 (2b+ c)2

1
2
  


t   4a (3b+ 2c)
(2b+ c)Lc+ (6b2 + 6bc+ c2)

=
12
2

1
2
  

t   3
2

;
where 1 = (b+ c) = (2b+ c)
2, 2 = (2b+ c)Lc+(6b
2 + 6bc+ c2), and 3 = 4a (3b+ 2c).
Note that we have trsj=1=2 = tsrj=1=2 =  + 4
p
(2b+ c) f= (L+ 1) (4b+ c), when the
distribution is symmetric. By di¤erentiating the equations and evaluating at the equal
distribution of skilled workers, we can examine the stability of the symmetric distribu-
tion. The impact of the relocation of workers can be decomposed as
[dV ]1=2 = [dW ]1=2 + [dS]1=2 :
Each elements can be expressed as
[dW ] 1
2
=

@W
@

1
2
+

@W
@trs

1
2

@trs
@

1
2
+

@W
@tsr

1
2

@tsr
@

1
2
;
and
[dS] 1
2
=

@S
@

1
2
+

@S
@trs

1
2

@trs
@

1
2
+

@S
@tsr

1
2

@tsr
@

1
2
:
Note that

@tsr
@

1=2
=  @trs
@

1=2
= 4(4Ab c)(4b+c)
(L+1)
q
f(2b+c)(L+1)
(4b+c)
. The derivatives of each el-
ements can be expressed as follows: [@W=@trs]1=2 =  [@W=@tsr]1=2 =  (L bt)(L+1)(b+c)2(2b+c) ,
[@W=@]1=2 =
(b+c)(L+2(1 ))(4a t(2b+c+Ac))t
4(2b+c)
, [@S=@]1=2 =
(b+c)2(2a bt)t
(2b+c)2
and [@S=@trs]1=2
=   [@S=@tsr]1=2 =
(b+c)(8a(b+c)+c2t 2t(2b+c)2)
16(2b+c)2
: Applying these results, we have the fol-
lowing equation
[dV ]1=2 =

@W
@

1
2
+

@S
@

1
2
;
as in (18).
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Figure 1: Transport costs from region r to s 
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(2a) Decreasing fixed costs    (2b) Decreasing marginal costs 
Figure 2: Stability of symmetric distribution 
 
Notes: Horizontal axis is the difference of indirect utility at different share of skilled workers. Dotted lines indicate stable symmetric equilibrium and 
solid lines indicate unstable symmetric equilibrium. In (2a), we set τ=0.05. When f=0.9 or 0.85, partial equilibrium is stable. When f=0.7, Core-periphery 
structure is stable. In (2b), we set f=0.7. When τ=0.15, partial equilibrium is stable. When τ=0.1 and τ=0.05, Core-periphery structure is stable. 
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(3a) Decreasing marginal costs    (3b) Decreasing unskilled population 
Figure 3: Simulation of sustain point 
 
Notes: Horizontal axis is the difference of indirect utility at Core periphery. When the function is below zero, it shows the incentives of skilled workers 
and firms to relocate to the peripheral region. Thicker line shows larger value of (a) marginal costs or unskilled population. 
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Figure 4: Location equilibria in ( f,τ)-space 
 
Notes: This simulation is performed over 151*151 cells. The share of each area is as follows; 
Symmetric autarky (81.8%), Symmetric equilibrium (2.26%), Core-periphery (10.02%), CP+Sym 
(3.65%), Symmetric and Partial equilibrium (2.94%), and CP, Symmetric and Partial equilibrium 
(0.05%). (f,τ)=(0,0) is excluded for the above calculation since any distribution of skilled 
workers gives identical real wages any distribution can be equilibrium. Figures with different 
values of unskilled population are available upon request.  
 
